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ILLIAM G. THOMAS 
Nothing Ought to Astonish Us 
Confederate Civilians in the 1864 
Shenandoah Valley Campaign 
N ancy Emerson lived in Staunton, Virginia, and kept a diary intermittently throughout the Civil War. Emerson was raised in Massachusetts and moved south with her brother, a Lutheran minister, in the late 1850s. They be- came Confederates, transplanting themselves and driv- 
ing deep roots into the new soil around them. Emerson intended her diary to 
be read by her "northern friends, should any of them have the curiosity to read 
[it] ." She felt increasingly sick with what she thought might be typhoid fever, so 
she directed that the journal "be forwarded to" her northern friends "at some 
future time." She wondered what her friends in the North thought about the 
war and the South, and what they thought about the destruction of civilian 
property in Staunton and farther up the Valley in Lexington in June 1864. She 
wondered whether any of her friends in the North had even heard of the pillag- 
ing in the Valley and whether they favored '?his unjust &abominable war." She 
decided that she could not guess what they thought anymore- their distance 
ofmind and spirit were too great. "Such strange things happen these days," she 
concluded, "that nothing ought to astonish us."' 
Confederate civilians in the Shenandoah Valley might have thought they 
knew what to expect of the war by 1864, but they soon found themselves taken 
aback by Union successes and Union aggressiveness, determination, and com- 
petence. They admitted to themselves that while nothing ought to astonish 
them, nearly everything in the summer and fall of 1864 did. The war changed 
from something largely distant and contained to something unpredictable and 
invasive. Union armies in the Valley were better led, more determined, and 
more hardened than before. Confederate armies in the Valley were less well 
led, less determined, and at times less courageous than in the past. Confeder- 
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ate civilians found themselves less sure of their security, their army, and their 
prospects.* 
Valley civilians had good reason to be surprised at the changes in 1864. In 
the preceding years, they witnessed a more limited war, one in which Con- 
federate armies swept enemy forces out of the Shenandoah and Federal forces 
never sustained a hard policy against civilians. In 1862, Confederate major gen- 
eral Thomas J. Jackson maneuvered and fought to clear the Valley of Union 
forces in a few short weeks. Panic shook Staunton in April 1862 when Union 
forces appeared nearby. One Confederate officer from Staunton called the ex- 
citement "exceedingly ludicrous and amusing." He chuckled at "women and 
children and negroes and especially the men and more especially the office- 
holding men - Quartermaster and Commissioner" who "were seen running to 
and fro through rainT3 
Jackson's decisive engagements and brilliant marches dazzled Confederate 
civilians and gave them unsurpassed confidence in the supremacy of their army, 
its commanders, and its cause. The leading citizens ofAugusta County drafted 
a testimonial of appreciation to Jackson for "protecting their homesteads from 
desolation, and themselves and their families from insult and oppression." The 
editors of the Staunton Spectator praised Jackson's service. "Their advance 
guards were at our very borders," the paper reminded readers, "and a general 
feeling of insecurity pervaded the community. In the midst of our apprehen- 
sion, and when some of our citizens had begun to remove their families and 
property, a significant message was received from Gen. Jackson, urging our 
people to remain quiet, that the enemy were not yet in Augusta!" After the 
Valley was secure and Lee's forces were winning battles around Richmond, 
Nancy Emerson reflected, "Public thanks were offered for their [the Confeder- 
ate forces'] deliverance. Our help is in God &in  him alone.'% 
God's role in the struggle seemed apparent to Confederate civilians in the 
Valley before the 1864 campaign. When Confederate forces drove Maj. Gen. 
George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac from Richmond in 1862, Nancy 
Emerson considered it evidence of God's justice and plan for the Confederacy. 
"This judgment from God has fallen upon the North because of their declen- 
sion from him," Emerson affirmed. She could not "for one moment believe that 
a righteous God" would allow the Confederacy to "be trodden down as the 
mud of the streets, whatever our cruel and insolent invaders might threaten." 
Emerson knew that her neighbors, fellow parishioners, and friends had prayed 
fervently for direction: "Too many prayers have been ascending to heavens 
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night & day for such an event to come to pass." Later, in early 1863, Emerson 
reflected on the ~revious year's events and concluded, "Blessed be the Lord 
who has not given us as a prey to their [Yankee] teeth. As a nation, we have in a 
measure acknowledged God, & he has appeared for us most ~onderfully."~ 
Confederate civilians in the Valley believed they had been delivered in 1862 
from desperate danger by the brilliance of Jackson as an instrument of their 
Christian God. Nancy Emerson continually referred to the dangers to the Val- 
ley in 1862. "We have much to be grateful for," Emerson thought. "For months 
we were under frequent apprehensions that the Yankees would come in & get 
posession of the Valley, but the Lord mercifully preserved us from the danger, 
& has delivered us from the fear." The southern newspapers were clear as well 
about the stakes in the war, informing citizens of the consequences of a north- 
ern victory: southerners, the editors predicted, would be "left without rights, 
without legal remedies, an inferior race creeping on the face of our own land." 
Less dramatically, Jedediah Hotchkiss, the gifted cartographer who served 
with Stonewall Jackson and his successors, wrote his ten-year-old daughter, 
Nellie, that the Yankees "would come and destroy us and our country if they 
could." Emerson also saw the dangers of a Yankee invasion, lamenting, "How 
many churches have they polluted, how many graves desecrated. How have 
they soaked our soil with the blood ofour noblest & best.. . . May the righteous 
Lord plead our cause against an ungodly nationT6 
Victories in the first half of 1863 reassured Valley Confederates and seemed 
to confirm their understanding of their role in the war. Lt. Gen. Richard S. 
Ewell's triumph over Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy at Winchester on June 14- 15, 
together with Robert E. Lee's success at Chancellorsville in early May, caused 
Valley civilians to   lace their faith in the superiority of southern arms. When 
Nancy Emerson learned about Milroy's defeat, she rejoiced, calling it "glorious 
news" and noting the capture of "several thousand prisoners & stores without 
number." She had also heard comforting stories from Winchester about "an old 
negro who was kept on nothing but water for three days because he refused to 
work & said he was 'secesh.'" The story described Federal officers putting the 
black man in hard labor breaking rocks and starving him into submission, yet 
he refused to give in and insisted he was secessionist to the core. "Noble fel- 
low. It does one good to hear such instances," Emerson affirmed with thorough 
sincerity, as if in 1863 even black slaves were completely unshakable in their 
commitment to the Confederate cause. The battle at Gettysburg, which marked 
the bloody culmination of Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania in June and July, reg- 
istered in the Shenandoah Valley as no more than a temporary setback. A Valley 
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newspaper called Gettysburg "one of the severest of the war, . . . a hard fought 
battle . . . in which we were successful, though with heavy loss." Southern news- 
papers gleefully reported that during the Pennsylvania campaign northern "fu- 
gitives . . . keep pouring into Harrisburg, Lancaster and other cities, in a state of 
complete terror, bringing their cattle, merchandise and household goods with 
them."' 
Because Valley civilians had not fully experienced the destructive nature of 
the war at the beginning of the 1864 campaign, they had yet to understand their 
vital role as witnesses and participants in a changing conflict. Confederates 
took the 1862 Valley campaign as a mark of God's deliverance and the victories 
in 1863 as further evidence ofdivine favor. When Federal troops returned to the 
Valley in 1864, Confederate civilians faced anew their fears and expectations 
of the war. Their capacity for vengeance and retribution surprised them. Both 
emotions unnerved them, drew comment, and forced self-examination-but 
did not alter their purpose. The war, however strange it had become, was to be 
fought out, and Confederate civilians in the Valley remained determined to see 
it t h r o ~ g h . ~  
Confederate civilians took their bearings along lines of connection in their 
inner lives with family, neighbors, and God. They combined allegiance, friend- 
ship, and faith to find a fixed position on the war, and in so doing to better 
comprehend their reactions. As 1864 inaugurated more destructive capaci- 
ties in the war, they were particularly attentive to the conduct of Confederate 
troops. When Confederate forces plundered farms, took the war to northern 
women and children, and exhibited reckless lack of discipline during battles, 
civilians became concerned about the rightness of their cause. Many Valley ci- 
vilians expected their men in the field to act like southern Christian soldiers, 
in effect to represent the best values of the new nation. They defined Federal 
troops as barbarians, willing to set aside codes of morality, honor, and Chris- 
tian faith and to behave in a reprehensible, immoral, and unchristian manner. 
"God grant that the day may soon come when we shall be separated from such a 
race," one Confederate wrote his wife in the summer of 1864, as he detailed the 
depredations of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan's Union cavalry. Later that fall, 
he encouraged her: "Don't you all feel discouraged. . . . Providence never will 
smile upon a people so lost to the best feelings of our nature and who conduct 
warfare in such uncivilized waysTg 
The Shenandoah Valley harbored strong Confederate allegiances that grew 
among civilians not only from their faith in the divine but also from their expe- 
rience in worldly affiirs. The Valley's counties stood among the richest in Vir- 
ginia in 1860. Augusta, Rockbridge, Frederick, and Rockingham in particular 
stood in the top twenty counties in Virginia for improved acreage in farms, 
value of livestock, and cash value of farms. Valley civilians increasingly found 
their economy and social experience tied to the institution of slavery. The re- 
gion boasted 17 percent of Virginia's slaveowning households and 10 percent 
of Virginia's slaveholders. Neighboring counties in the Piedmont, which led 
Virginia in slaveholding and value of real estate and personal property, exerted 
a strong influence on the Valley's growth. With its rich farms and successful 
commercial development, the Valley, like most of Virginia, remained Unionist 
in sentiment throughout the secession crisis, but in 1861 the region committed 
itself to the Confederate cause. The depth of that commitment, while not as 
complete as in some other areas of Virginia, especially the Piedmont, placed 
the region overwhelmingly in the Confederate column. Enlistment patterns, 
for example, demonstrate that 65 percent of the eligible white men in the Val- 
ley joined the Confederate forces-compared to 75 percent in the Tidewater 
and 85 percent in the Piedmont. The Shenandoah Valley's commitment to the 
Confederacy, like its increasing connections to the institution of slavery, were 
evident in the broadsides that encouraged civilians to become soldiers: "Your 
soil has been invaded by your Abolition foes, and we call upon you to rally at 
once, and drive them back."1° 
By 1864, after years of general success in the Valley for the Confederate army, 
civilians in the Shenandoah Valley experienced a sharp change in the conduct 
of U.S. forces in the region. Federal soldiers came in June to occupy previously 
private civilian space, letting residents of the Valley know that their enemy 
could control them and their homes and that no rebel army could free them. 
Often in the Valley campaign, this presence of Federal troops in and among ci- 
vilians brought a new urgency to the war. For its part, the Federal army contin- 
ually tried to calibrate its orders for destruction. For example, at various points 
in the Valley campaign Union officers ordered the destruction of Confederate 
supply installations but not civilians' homes, the burning of a three-mile radius 
around the site of a particular killing, and the torching of barns with hay but 
not those without. These limitations were meant to maintain discipline and 
order in the Federal army as the war widened to include the destruction of civil- 
ian property. '' 
The Federal army swept into the Valley in 1864 in three phases: the first 
under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel in May, the second under Maj. Gen. David Hunter 
in June, and the third under General Sheridan in September and October. 
Each operation grew in scope and determination. Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's 
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orders for each of these operations developed more fully as well. He cautioned 
Sigel that "indiscriminate marauding should be avoided. Nothing should be 
taken not absolutely necessary for the troops, except when captured from an 
armed enemy." Grant's approach changed for the fall campaign. He directed 
Sheridan to 'Lest out Virginia clear and clean as far as they [Early's army] go, 
so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry their 
provender with them."12 
After Sigel's effort to control the Valley came to grief at the battle of New 
Market in May, General Hunter moved his force up the Valley with more pur- 
pose, defeating a hastily assembled Confederate force at Piedmont in Augusta 
County on June 5. The battle gave Valley civilians a taste of what the summer 
and fall would bring. It was a disaster for the Confederates, as two infantry bri- 
gades and the 3rd Battalion Valley Reserves tried to stop the more powerful and 
experienced Federal forces. The Reserves were local civilians, mostly boys and 
older men called into duty to protect their fellow citizens in an emergency. At 
the battle's crucial moment, Confederate cavalry failed to support the infantry, 
and the men ran from the battlefield in confusion. The  cavalry picked their way 
south and east over the Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, leaving the entire Shenan- 
doah Valley in Federal control for the first time in the war. Jacob Hildebrand, a 
Confederate supporter with three sons in the army, admitted that "from every 
indication we were routed." Two days later, Hildebrand went to the battlefield 
to help bury the dead but found only five bodies. He concluded optimistically 
that "the Yankees had more killed than we had." Joseph Waddell thought "no 
citizen of Staunton above the age ofinfancy, then living, will ever forget Sunday, 
the 5th ofJune, 1864." Waddell, a Confederate clerk, loaded all of his "valuable 
paper," mostly bonds and vouchers, into a trunk and headed for Waynesboro. 
He described the mood as "cheerful" and fully expected the Confederate army 
to regain supremacy in the Valley.13 
A decidedly less optimistic atmosphere prevailed in Staunton, which Hunter 
occupied on June 11- 12. For citizens of Augusta, like many others in the upper 
Valley, Hunter's army imposed the first major occupation of the war. The Fed- 
erals entered the homes of civilians and took food and property. When north- 
ern soldiers arrived at the home of Nancy Emerson's neighbor, "they took ev- 
erything they had to eat, all the pillow cases & sheet & towels & some of the 
ladies stockings . . . & destroyed things generally." According to Emerson, 
the soldiers "took off all the Negro men & boys they could, as well as all the 
horses" and "told the women they would take them next time they came." Wad- 
dell noted that "nearly all of the houses had been searched for provisions and 
arms," that "a large number of Negroes went off with the Yankees," and that 
"some persons here suffered much from the Yankees in loss of property [while] 
others escaped entirely." "Almost everybody lost horses," he reported. Wad- 
dell characterized the Federal army as full of "treachery" and "without motive, 
although characteristic of the people."14 
Federal officers, for their part, considered the Confederate civilians equally 
full of treachery. They were unsure of some Confederate women, particularly 
those not in the elite class. Wealthier Confederate women often received guards 
at their houses and were treated with respect, but more common women, either 
on the yeoman farms or in the small towns, encountered suspicion and at times 
hostility. One Union soldier found "pretty girls abundant" in Harrisonburg 
but called them "detestable secesh." David Hunter Strother, a Virginian who 
served as Hunter's chief of staff during the Valley campaign, found himself in 
several discussions with women and girls along the army's route. Early on in 
the campaign he decided "to have no more social intercourse with the people 
of the country" because it interfered with his "military duties" and brought 
him face to face with "outrage and distresses which awaken my sympathies but 
which I could not prevent."15 
Wary Union soldiers found some evidence of cooperation from Valley civil- 
ians. Federal officers convened groups ofprominent citizens to inform them of 
Hunter's "retaliatory" orders against bushwhackers and guerrillas, asking them 
to identify the culprits. In Newtown, as in other towns, these citizens complied 
and "promised to give all the information in their power."They pointed out 
a Mrs. Wilson's house as a refuge for guerrillas, whereupon Hunter's troops 
arrested her, charged her with "feeding and harboring guerrillas," burned all 
of her possessions, and marched her six miles to a guard tent. When Hunter's 
troops moved into Staunton, remarked one Federal, the women "greeted us 
pleasantly, waved their handkerchiefs, . . . and brought buckets of water or 
milk to quench our thirsts." Some dressed up for the occasion in their "Sunday 
dresses" and handed out bouquets of flowers to the invading soldiers. Federal 
officers wondered whether this demonstration was "sincere and loyal" or meant 
to insult them.16 
Nancy Emerson called the Federals a "cloud of locusts from the bottomless 
pit." She heard them say they would come back "to reap [the wheat harvest] ." 
In telling the story of the occupation, Emerson described what happened at her 
home. She began her entry for July g with the intention of telling "about some 
Yankee raiders" and noted that General Hunter's June occupation of Staunton 
"will not soon be forgotten in these parts." When Federal troops arrived, they 
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Maj. Gen. David Hunter. 
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demanded whiskey, flour, and bacon, in that order. Emerson watched as the 
soldiers ransacked the house. They took the shoes of her older male cousin be- 
cause shoes were "nearly impossible to get." In a moment of commercial brav- 
ery, the cousin bought the shoes back on the spot with a ten-dollar Ohio note. 
Emerson recorded her sister-in-law's outrage that the Federal army was injur- 
ing "innocent persons who had taken no part in the war." When she hurled 
this insult at the Federals, one responded, "You need not tell me that, I know 
all the people along here have sons in the army." Emerson reported that her 
sister-in-law was "afraid to undress" that night and slept but a few hours, as the 
household took turns keeping watch." 
The presence of armed and rowdy Federal troops terrified some women. 
When Hunter's forces pushed into Rockbridge County, Eva Honey Allen, a 
young woman living near Fincastle who had two brothers in Maj. Gen. George 
E. Pickett's division, grew anxious. As Hunter slowly proceeded up the Valley, 
swirling rumors preceded his army like a drop in barometric pressure before a 
summer thunderstorm. Allen had yet to see her first Yankee, but she had heard 
that they were buying barrels ofwhiskey several farms away. "We shall be much 
more afraid of them now than ever," she worried. Later that day, she finally saw 
her "first Yankees!" and confessed to feeling "relieved." They were polite and 
considerate, asking directions and moving off quickly, "shutting the gate after 
them," a gesture that surprised her. By the next day, rumors ofatheir doings are 
'as thick as blackberries,'" Allen recorded. Allen was most troubled by "very 
alarming" rumors that "the Negroes" were spreading, one of which claimed 
that Hunter was approaching with "a very large army, including 8,000 Ne- 
groes." Another story circulated that 200 or 300 Negro men from the Bedford 
area had joined the Federal force in the Valley. Still another report ran that the 
Federal army L'can't take the women off now, but will come back for them."18 
Confederate civilians of means retreated to mountain hideaways to keep 
clear of the grasping invaders, taking personal property, slaves, and livestock 
with them. When Hunter's army arrived in Lexington, David Hunter Strother 
observed 'La great deal of smoke in the mountains." When he inquired about 
it among the locals, they replied that '5t came from the camps of the refugees 
who were hiding" from the army "with their Negroes and cattle." Strother was 
surprised at the "satisfaction" that Confederate civilians expressed about their 
slaves' loyalty. From his perspective, black people only feigned loyalty to their 
masters. "The Negroes take the first opportunity they find of running into our 
lines and giving information as to where their masters are hidden," Strother 
noted.lg 
When Federal troops swept into an area, Confederate men had much to 
fear. They often attempted to hide, running into corn or wheat fields or into 
the mountains. At the approach of Federal troops, Joseph Waddell evacuated 
Staunton and moved out of their path. He paid close attention to rumors about 
their return throughout the summer and fall, always ready to move again if 
necessary. In Winchester, the brothers of Matthella Page Harrison hid in their 
cornfield up to three times a day as rumors circulated about the imminent ar- 
rival of Federal troops. Even the Episcopal minister fled to avoid arrest. "The 
men & boys always kept out of the way," Nancy Emerson recorded, "as they 
were sometimes taken off & did not know what treatment they might receive." 
Some were shot down as they ran away; others escaped undetected and watched 
as Federal troops stood in their homes and yards. "They always fire upon those 
who run from them," Nancy Emerson noted. The women, she added, "were left 
to shift for themselves as best they could." She and her sister-in-law defended 
the home against Union soldiers who arrived on June 11. "Those who left their 
houses fared worse than others, at least their houses did," Emerson concluded. 
Emerson's brother Luther, a Presbyterian minister, abandoned the house to 
avoid capture by the Federal troops. The family considered the move wise be- 
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cause, according to Emerson, the northern army has "such spite against preach- 
ers & especially as he has written & spoken so freely, that his [pro-Confederate] 
sentiments are generally known."20 
Contemporaries and later historians focused on Hunter's attacks on promi- 
nent Confederate civilians who seemed to stand symbolically for the rebellion. 
In Staunton, Hunter ordered the destruction of the Walkers' mill, Crawford 
and Young's woolen factory, J. A. Trotter's stables, and W. F. Smith's mill. All 
of these men operated factories that directly aided the Confederate military 
effort, and their families supported the Confederacy. Joseph Waddell reported 
that the "people of Staunton have not suffered at the hands of the Yankees, 
except the owners ofmills and factories." Forces under Hunter targeted institu- 
tions and businesses that they considered clearly recognized extensions of the 
Confederate war machine. Hunter proceeded to Lexington, where he burned 
part of the Virginia Military Institute and Gov. John Letcher's home, both of 
which were intimately connected to the southern cause. Confederate newspa- 
pers expressed outrage at the burnings and destruction of property. The Re- 
fiublican Vindicator condemned Hunter's behavior at Lexington as LLone of the 
most wanton and barbaric acts of the war." The paper compared Hunter to 
Mat. Gen. Benjamin F. "Beast" Butler, whose occupation of New Orleans in 
1862 stood in southern minds for graceless and mindless violence against civil- 
ians, especially women. When Confederate lieutenant general Jubal A. Early 
defeated Hunter at Lynchburg on June 18 and pushed him out of the Valley, 
the Staunton newspaper hailed the Confederates and jeered Hunter. "He has 
accomplished nothing," the paper sneered, "as regards the overthrow of the 
Confederacy, having run away from the only point he could have materially 
damaged it."21 The Shenandoah Valley remained largely free of a major Federal 
military presence from June 18 until early September. 
In addition to its careful targeting of symbolic institutions and people, Hun- 
ter's army directed considerable anger toward Confederate women - behaviors 
that Valley civilians, such as Eva Honey Allen, sometimes linked in excoriat- 
ing their enemy. When Hunter issued a stirring statement from his headquar- 
ters in Wheeling, West Virginia, that his troops had accomplished $10 million 
worth of damage to Confederate property, Allen hoped Early "and his men 
will remember this, when they reach Pennsylvania." Hearsay in Rockbridge 
County confirmed Hunter's perfidy in her eyes. She learned from a reliable 
source "that one of his [Hunter's] objects in this expedition was to degrade 
the Va. women, 'that he was determined to break their proud spirit.'" Hunter, 
according to this source, thought "southern women had done more to bring 
Ruins of the Virginia Military Institute. Francis Trevelyan Miller, ed., The Photografihic 
History of the Civil War, lo vols. (New York: Review of Reviews, I~I I ) ,  3:140. 
on this rebellion than the men and they ought to be made to suffer for it." One 
older Rockbridge citizen told Allen that the Federal army's "mode of warfare 
was something new in history." He told her "a war between civilized nations 
was carried on by battles between opposing armies." But the Federal army, he 
said, "fought by burning homes or robbing women & children."22 
Hunter's burning of V.M.I. and Governor Letcher7s home attracted the at- 
tention of the Confederate press, but his army's actions against women and 
families struck more directly at the core of the southern household. Hunter's 
troops executed a Confederate civilian in Rockbridge County for defending 
his home and family. "The execution will take place in a few minutes," David 
S. Creigh wrote on June lo, in a last letter to his wife Emily. He explained that 
he was to be hanged and the house in which he was imprisoned burned around 
him. Creigh had shot a Federal soldier who ransacked his home and threatened 
his daughters. The soldier recovered from the wound, and Federal officers 
captured Creigh, imprisoned him, tried, and executed him. Micajah Woods, 
Creigh's nephew and a Confederate artilleryman whose unit served in the area 
with Jubal Early, reported to his father, Creigh's brother-in-law, that "Uncle 
David was certainly executed at Mr. Morrison's near Brownsburg." Federal 
troops buried Creigh in a shallow grave near the execution site. Family mem- 
bers, hearing of the execution, went to the place and "had him interred prop- 
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erly." According to Micajah Woods, another man who tried to protect his home 
"was treated terribly," and L'his mind is said to be affected by the scenes he and 
his daughter have passed." 
Creigh's case became a cause cklsbre of the Central Presbyterian, a south- 
ern denominational newspaper and printing company, but it was not the only 
execution in Rockbridge. Fannie Wilson recorded the execution of Matthew 
White Jr.: "He was seen on Sunday afternoon marching out of town with a 
squad of soldiers, who shot him for bush-whacking." She noted that Federal 
troops carried out the execution "all the time deceiving his parents." When 
the parents asked about their son, they were told he was "at home." Wilson 
seemed to consider the deception particularly noteworthy. After the Federals 
left the area, "his body was found unburied in the woods near Mrs. Cameron's 
house."23 
Many women drew clear distinctions between the honorable behavior 
of Confederate soldiers and the depredations of Federal troops. In Fauquier 
County in July, Lucy Johnson Ambler matter-of-factly recorded the destruc- 
tion of her plantation. Federal soldiers "destroyed the mills. They burnt down 
our stacks ofwheat. . . . They took the negroes' clothes and any little thing be- 
longing to them they wanted. The officers heard the firing of the guns as they 
were killing the sheep, but let it go on." Ambler believed that the officers led 
and encouraged the destruction and turned a blind eye toward the inhuman- 
ity and cruelty of it. "All sense of shame and decency seems to have deserted 
them," she observed. They acted "in the most Godless manner."24 
Confederate civilians cheered when Early's forces cleared the Valley of Fed- 
eral troops and crossed the Potomac to threaten Washington. Mary Catharine 
Powell Cochran in Loudoun County followed the northern newspaper cover- 
age of Early's raid. "We have all enjoyed intensely the panic in Yankeedom," 
she wrote in her diary on July 13. Cochran had heard some suggest that Early's 
troops "should pillage and burn as the Yankees have done," but she thought 
otherwise. "In our heart of hearts," she confessed, "we can't help feeling proud 
and pleased that they didn't [burn and pillage] ." Cochran believed that "such 
dirty work" would "defile" the "hands" ofthe Confederacy's "sons and brothers 
and husbands." She considered Early's raid a L'test" that would prove "South- 
ern men cannot turn thieves and house burners at a moment's notice."25 
When Federal troops terrorized southern women, their male relatives often 
swore vengeance within the boundaries of honor. Virginia Military Institute 
cadet Lawrence Royster, for example, stated the matter plainly. 'LMother lost 
absolutely everything," he told his friend, John E. Roller. She was forced to be- 
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come a refugee, became sick, and lost all means of survival. "If I am ever spared 
to get into land," Royster swore, "I will respect nothing but a woman's 
person, I'll break, pillage and plunder."Z6 
Given an opportunity to take such action in July, Early's army respected 
little in their path. Early's forces demanded levies from Frederick, Maryland, 
and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, after they threatened Washington in late 
July. The  burning of Chambersburg by Brig. Gen. John McCausland's cavalry 
struck some Confederate civilians as neither wise nor honorable. Joseph Wad- 
dell thought the reprisal burnings sure to further enrage the northern people 
and revive their "war spirit." "The Yankees," Waddell predicted, "will come 
back and burn a hundred for one." Waddell considered the Confederate raid 
bad policy because the Confederacy's only hope lay with northern public opin- 
ion, which could demand an end to the war. He thought "it would be far better 
to let their [the Federals'] outrages stand out before the world. . . to the disgust 
of even some of their own people." Waddell's opinion on this matter hardened, 
and he later called the destruction of Chambersburg "a miserable affiir, . . . 
horribly stupid . . . a blunder." Yet Waddell admitted feeling a certain degree of 
pleasure that "the miserable Yankee nation, who have been burning and pillag- 
ing throughout our own country for so long, have now been made to suffer in 
their own homes."27 
Other Confederates joined Waddell in experiencing a tangle of emotions re- 
garding Early's actions north of the Potomac River-vindication mixed with 
chagrin, joy with fear, and spite with abhorrence. Waddell reported in his diary 
that the retaliation provoked much discussion in Staunton among its citizens. 
Jedediah Hotchkiss explained the burning of Chambersburg to his wife as di- 
rectly connected and proportional to Hunter's burnings in Lexington. Hotch- 
kiss observed that citizens ofchambersburg "laughed at General McCausland" 
and refused to pay the $loo,ooo demanded.28 Although Waddell filled several 
pages in his diary with the reasons he considered the raids misguided, some 
newspapers in Staunton and Richmond called the actions "just retaliation" and 
argued that a reciprocal policy would continue until the Federal army returned 
"to that mode ofwarfare practiced by all civilized nations." Not all editors took 
this position. Some criticized the raid as "stupid" and feared its repercussions 
on the northern draft at a critical time when public morale in the United States 
seemed to be lagging. "As if to stimulate the tardy Pennsylvanians to rush to 
arms against US," one disgusted southern editor lamented, "Chambersburg is 
burned down."Zg 
Eva Honey Allen learned of the raid from northern newspapers and rumor. 
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"The Yankees do not find burning such a pleasant pastime," she commented 
with relish, "when their own homes are in question." She vowed not to "waste" 
any "sympathy or pity" on the northern people. The burning at Chambersburg 
led Allen to make a private confession in her diary. She had "never recorded the 
fate of'the star spangled banner'" that her brother brought her from Chambers- 
burg after the Gettysburg campaign. She took the flag to her room, grabbed a 
pack of matches, locked the door, and burned it. "I took a 'savage pleasure' in 
burning that flag," she confessed.30 
Despite a growing hatred among Confederates for what the United States 
flag represented, even some southern officers expressed dismay at the behavior 
of Early7s troops in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Brig. Gen. Bradley T. John- 
son, a cavalry commander under McCausland, filed a report with the office of 
the adjutant general on August 10,1864, accusing Confederate forces of "outra- 
geous conduct." Johnson's brigade had been routed in a small battle at Moore- 
field, and he was trying desperately to save his career. Jedediah Hotchkiss con- 
sidered Johnson "culpably negligent" for the "extremely disgraceful" defeat 
at Moorefield. According to Hotchkiss, who served at Early's headquarters, 
Johnson had been asleep when his brigade came under attack and "barely es- 
caped, in his stocking feet & on the bare back ofa horse." Hotchkiss considered 
Johnson a "bold dashing fellow" who as an officer had "no discipline." For his 
part, Johnson considered the undisciplined behavior of his men at Chambers- 
burg offensive both to himself and "the cause." "Every crime in the catalogue 
of infamy has been committed," he wrote, "except murder and rape." Johnson 
gave examples of outright robbery-even a Catholic priest was robbed of his 
watch on his way to service. "Thus, the grand spectacle ofa national retaliation 
was reduced to a miserable huckstering for greenbacks," Johnson concluded. 
Worse than this, Johnson reported drunken Confederate soldiers back in Vir- 
ginia who "knocked down and kicked an aged woman who has two sons in the 
Confederate army." After choking the woman's sister, they locked her in a barn 
and set fire to it-all because the woman would not give them fresh horses.31 
While civilians such as Waddell considered the Confederate raid bad policy, 
others had the sinking feeling that it symbolized something more - a turning 
point in the conduct of Confederate arms, and in the course of the war, that 
would lead to even more severe consequences for civilians. For these individu- 
als, the raid too much resembled Hunter's dishonorable, blatantly criminal 
campaign in June. The monetary levies appeared to be little more than high- 
way robbery, and the burning of homes scarcely differed from what Hunter 
and his forces had done. Many civilians and soldiers had difficulty reconciling 
the behavior of Early's cavalry with Lee's order issued from Chambersburg 
in 1863. Lee held that the Confederate army would "only make war on armed 
men" and could not "take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered 
without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all." Lee presented his men with a 
clear statement that vengeance was for God not man, and he forbade "unnec- 
essary or wanton injury to private property." Newspaper editors at the time 
admitted that not all southerners agreed with Lee's views. The Democratic 
paper in Staunton, for example, held that the only way to make "the mass of the 
Northern people see the outrageous impropriety ofconducting the war on their 
uncivilized plan was to make them feel some of the burdens of that plan, and let 
them realize that plunder and destruction was not and could not be confined to 
one side alone." The paper considered Lee's orders the proper course of action 
but counseled that "the remembrance of wrongs so lately inflicted will cause 
many to feel di~appointed."~~ 
After Early burned Chambersburg, he telegraphed Lee, "I alone am respon- 
sible for this act." Early's actions in Pennsylvania and Lee's clear position in 
1863 set up a running dispute after the war regarding Confederate conduct. The 
Confederate Veteran noted that the burning of Chambersburg initiated "much 
controversy" and that "many believed it was accidental." Southern civilians 
and soldiers who lived far from the Valley thought it an accident that seemed 
inconsistent with the conduct of Confederate armies. In 1884, a Baltimore law- 
yer who had served in McCausland's cavalry tried to explain his conduct in the 
burning. He maintained that the cavalry consisted of the "very first young men 
of our State, . . . guided by the strongest instincts ofprinciple." He implied that 
such upstanding citizen soldiers would not behave in an immoral fashion; after 
all, they were now doctors and lawyers, prosperous, Christian, and dutiful. As 
for the fate of "your petty little town," he wrote a Chambersburg resident, it 
was burned because it happened to be "the nearest and most accessible place of 
importance for us to get to." This cavalryman had been captured at Moorefield 
and imprisoned: "For eight long, miserable, weary months we bewailed the day 
that Chambersburg was founded, builded, and burned."33 
Southern civilians wanted to see their young men as gallant and good Chris- 
tian soldiers. Nancy Emerson considered the South more civilized than the 
North, and she pointed to its Christian faith as one of the main reasons. She 
railed against some Boston newspapers' advertisements about the capture of 
10,ooo Bibles by blockading U.S. naval vessels. She thought it "outrageous for 
people calling themselves Christians to be chuckling over the infamous robber- 
ies of their countrymen." As if to convince herself of the truth of her statement, 
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Emerson addressed the subject ofnorthern perfidy. "If you ask me how I know 
that their soldiers are more profane than ours? she wrote, "I answer the same 
way that I know most things, by testimony, abundant te~timony."~~ Yet in the 
aftermath of the Chambersburg burning, some southern civilians questioned 
how God could favor such action on the part of their army and worried what 
the answer would mean for their future.35 
The Maryland campaign in the summer of 1864 gave Confederate civilians in 
the Valley some confidence that the war might end soon and favorably for their 
cause. Early's army cleared the Valley of Federal troops, threatened Washing- 
ton, and delivered retribution on northern civilians. The crops were safe and 
abundant, money worth more after currency reform. Civilians read northern 
newspapers and their "talk about starving the South." Southern newspapers 
scoffed lightheartedly that there was plenty to eat: "The young rook is eaten 
in England, and as we know of no difference between the rook, and the crow, 
we do not see why young crows may not be eaten, or, indeed, in war times, old 
By the second week of September, Confederate hopes faded and civilians 
grew despondent. The fall of Atlanta on September 2 altered expectations 
about the war's course. "I have so much bad news to record," Eva Allen wrote, 
"that I scarcely know where to begin. . . . The general opinion is that the war is 
to be interminable now." Allen confessed a secret desire to "shut the book and 
sit me down and die." Other diarists recorded similar signs of collective de- 
pression. Waddell gave his first indication of anxiety on September 14, when he 
noted "a rather somber feeling in the community today-nothing to be hoped 
for from any peace party in the North." Waddell considered the Confederacy 
"about used 
The state of depression among Confederate civilians deepened in Septem- 
ber when General Sheridan's army came into a region still rich in logistical pro- 
duction. General in Chief U. S. Grant famously instructed Sheridan to make 
the Shenandoah Valley a "barren waste" by carrying off or destroying anything 
ofvalue to the Confederate military effort. The Valley in 1864 held large quanti- 
ties of crops and supplies, despite the summer's long drought and the invasions 
of Union armies early in the summer. The Staunton newspaper reported in 
mid-July that the wheat crop was "of excellent quality and well filled." The 
paper predicted that the corn crop also would be successful. Hotchkiss wrote 
that Clarke and Jefferson counties had "abundance in them" of flour and noted 
that Early's commissary had "ioo,ooo bushels ofwheat at his command." Wad- 
dell reported Augusta County to be "rich in all that is needed to sustain an 
army. . . . The mills are full of wheat." Waddell worried that if the Federal 
troops came "the loss to our army will be irreparable." Even in late September, 
Sheridan reported from Harrisonburg that "the country from here to Staunton 
was abundantly supplied with forage and grain."s8 
Sheridan's troopers set crops and barns on fire throughout the lower Val- 
ley in August and September. These Federals, noted Sheridan in his official 
report, operated under "the most positive orders . . . not to burn  dwelling^."^^ 
According to Waddell, northern troops in Staunton "entered very few private 
houses and committed no depredations," but he heard of L'great destruction in 
Rockbridge and all the Lower Valley." "Women were wringing their hands and 
crying while the men were carried off as prisoners and the barns and hay stacks 
were burning," Waddell wrote. Matthella Harrison witnessed the destruction 
at her family's plantation. "Every head of stock driven off," she dryly recorded: 
"Those young animals that refused to go were shot down." When the enemy's 
officers and soldiers came to her family's plantation, she heard the sound of an 
uncontrolled mob - "the shouts, ribald jokes, awful oaths, demonical laughter 
of the fiends." These soldiers also sought revenge. According to Harrison, their 
watchword was "Remember Chamber~burg."~~ 
From the top of Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge Mountains in late September, 
Early's army, defeated recently in the battles of Third Winchester and Fisher's 
Hill, defended its last toehold in the Valley while Federal cavalry carried out 
Sheridan's orders to destroy Confederate supplies. The gap offered a particu- 
larly high vantage from which to see the destruction. Deployed in a close defen- 
sive perimeter along the ridge lines, soldiers could watch the fires on the Valley 
floor below. "Immediately in my view were burnt not less than one hundred hay 
stacks and barns," one artilleryman wrote his father; "nearly every farm large 
or small has been visited by the torch." This man admitted that the "where- 
abouts of the enemy" were "unknown precisely" and guessed that Federal cav- 
alry bore responsibility for the burning. The Valley, he thought, was no longer 
"tenable" for any army, and he feared the same measures would be extended to 
the Confederate country as a whole.41 
While Confederates speculated on the enemy's activities, Union soldiers 
and officers engaged in widespread destruction fueled not only by orders from 
Grant and Sheridan but also by determination to avenge Confederate guerrilla 
activity. When Lt. John Rogers Meigs, son of the Union quartermaster general 
and a favorite of Sheridan's, was killed near Harrisonburg on October 3 by 
Confederate cavalrymen, Little Phil ordered a complete burning of all prop- 
erty within a three-mile radius of the site. "Since I came into the Valley from 
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"Wilson's Cavalry Foraging in the Shenandoah Valley." This woodcut of a sketch by 
James E. Taylor gave readers of Frank Leslie's IllustratedNew@a$er an idea of how 
Sheridan's campaign affected many civilians in the Valley. Paul F. Mottelay and 
T. Campbell-Copeland, eds., The Soldier in Our Civil War, 2 vols. (New York and 
Atlanta: Stanley Bradley Publishing Company, 1893), 2:345. 
Harper's Ferry," Sheridan concluded, "every train, every small party, and every 
straggler, has been bushwhacked by the people." Rumors swirled that Con- 
federate civilians, not uniformed cavalry, were responsible for Meigs's death, 
and Federal troops, especially Sheridan, viewed the killing as a "murder." The 
day after Meigs's death, Col. William H. Powell informed the citizens of Page 
County that two Confederate prisoners of war would be shot or hanged for 
every Union soldier killed by a southern bushwhacker. Indeed, that very day 
Powell reported that he "had two bushwackers shot to death" in retaliation for 
the killing of one of his soldiers.4* 
Despite the intensity of various accounts of The Burning and the escalation 
of reprisal violence in the region, some observers mentioned the destruction 
only in passing-as just another strange happening in a long war. Jedediah 
Hotchkiss, an astute observer, only mentioned the burning of civilian prop- 
erty once in his journal. On August 17, he stated matter-of-factly, "We found 
the enemy gone this morning and the smoke rising from all parts of the Lower 
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Valley from the burning of barns and hay and wheat stacks by the retreating 
Yankees." Hotchkiss's emphasis at end of his statement was on the retreating 
Yankees. The smoke of the burning appeared more as evidence of their retreat 
than of their pillage. A month later, Hotchkiss returned home to Staunton to 
find "the people are busy sowing grain." Shortly thereafter, he reported "some 
difficulty" gathering supplies "for the year" from his neighbors and friends. 
Even so, Hotchkiss thought that he "got along 
Hotchkiss's optimism about the limited scope of the damage somewhat ob- 
scured the fact that the Federals had burned great quantities of hay and barns, 
driven off large numbers of livestock, and enlisted or emancipated hundreds of 
slaves. Only Rockingham County undertook a complete survey of the damage 
and losses to the civilian population. The county acted in response to a memo 
from the Office Recorder of Virginia Forces, appointed by Governor William 
Smith. The governor charged the office "to carefully ascertain what wrongs 
and injuries, contrary to the rules of war, have been committed upon the peo- 
ple of Virginia." The offense considered "worse than all" was "offering insult, 
outrage, and violence to defenceless ~omen.'"~ Rockingham followed through 
on the request, one of the only counties in the Valley to do so. It reported in 
November that a committee of seventy-two citizens from every section of the 
county canvassed their neighbors and compiled a complete survey of the dam- 
age in the campaign. Their findings were part of the record of the county court 
and subject to the court's scrutiny (see table 1). 
Rockingham County's estimate was, according to the newspaper, the con- 
servative, lower total ofthe returns gathered by the committee. The newspaper 
put the estimate at more than $25 million in Confederate prices, or $5 million 
in real value. Rockingham County's losses likely ranked among the most sig- 
nificant in the Valley. 
Heavy as these losses were, Sheridan's forces had inflicted limited and 
targeted damage that neither destroyed the entire Valley nor subjugated its 
population. The summer's drought and the war's loss of laborers lowered pro- 
duction levels from the 1860 highs, but perhaps by no more than 15 percent. 
Sheridan extravagantly claimed that his cavalry units struck so hard at civilian 
property that the Valley "will have little in it for man or beast." His final report 
claimed that Federals destroyed or captured 3,772 horses, 10,918 cattle, 12,000 
sheep, 15,000 hogs, 20,397 tons ofhay, 45,802 bushels ofwheat, 77,176 bushels 
of corn, 71 flour mills, and 1,200 barns.45 Rockingham apparently lost 450 of 
the 1,200 barns, 31 of 71 flourmills, and 6,000 of 20,000 tons of hay destroyed 
in the Valley.46 In Rockingham, where Sheridan's cavalry admittedly visited 
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Table 1. Estimate of Rockingham County Losses in 1864 Valley Campaign 
Compared with U.S. Census Agricultural Schedule Data for Rockingham 
County 
1860 U.S. Census 
Property Damage or Loss Amount or Number Agricultural Production 
Dwelling houses burned 
Barns burned 
Mills burned 
Fencing destroyed (miles) 
Bushels of wheat destroyed 
Bushels of corn destroyed 
Tons of hay destroyed 
Cattle carried off 
Horses carried off 
Sheep carried off 
Hogs carried off 
Factories burned 
Furnaces burned 
Sources: Staunton Refiublican Vindicator, November 18,1864; 1860 U.S. Census 
Agricultural Schedule, Rockingham County. 
widespread destruction, the county's conservative estimate of total losses rep- 
resented less than a quarter of production levels in 1860. Federal troops in 
Rockingham burned and destroyed more barns, hay, and wheat than any other 
agricultural products. Hogs, cattle, and corn remained in significant numbers. 
Citizens in Rockingham dutifully reported these losses, fully expecting that 
the process would eventually result in compensation from the state or Confed- 
erate government. They had reason to believe that the state government would 
come to their aid; in 1862 and 1863 it had proved attentive to the demands of a 
citizenry at war.47 
Through this destruction, Federal officers openly challenged the Confeder- 
ate civilians7 sense of security and faith in their government. They destroyed 
Confederate supplies and buildings and threatened Confederate men. They 
also visibly demonstrated the weakness of Confederate institutions. When 
Federal troops occupied Staunton in September, an officer "offered for sale a 
Confederate $1,000 bond," as if to dare Confederates to invest in their gov- 
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ernment's shaky future. Waddell noted that after some time the seller "could 
find no purchaser." In an elaborate display of magnanimity, the officer gave the 
bond to Andrew Hunter, cousin of the Federal general, "as partial compensa- 
tion for the burning of his house.'*8 
Not surprisingly, many black residents of the Valley did not see U. S. forces 
as menacing invaders. In Augusta County, for example, Nancy Jenkins Jeffer- 
son had lived before the war as a free black woman who made her living as a 
housekeeper. She had two children in her household and owned real estate 
and some property. Some time after the war she married a freedman named 
Thomas Jefferson. She claimed her sympathies "were all the time with the 
Union." Nancy's brother, presumably a slave, was "in the Confederate Army" 
and "was forced to wait on an officer." L'Our Loyalty is indisputable," Nancy 
and Thomas claimed in 1877, "because we are colored persons." In September 
1864, Nancy harbored a Federal officer wounded in a nearby skirmish. "He was 
wounded at our door, and the Confederates would have stripped and murdered 
him after he was shot down, had he not been cared for by us," they claimed. 
The claim investigator looked into the matter and concluded that Nancy acted 
"at considerable risk to herself and property [and] kept him [the officer] con- 
cealed from the rebel troops until he could be removed to a place of safety." 
Nancy's claim was for compensation and services rendered during the 1864 
Valley campaign-including the care and hospitalization of a Federal officer 
and the loss of one 180-pound hog and eight barrels of flour.4Q 
Unionists in the Shenandoah Valley-whether free blacks, Dunkers, Men- 
nonites, or independent-minded yeomen-could experience sharp treatment 
in 1864 from Confederate civilians, officers, and soldiers as well as from the 
invading Federals. In Winchester, Mordecai Purcell faced potential violence 
when a Confederate enlisted man promised to "shoot him ifhe did not give him 
a horse that he had and prove his loyalty to the Confederacy." Purcell watched 
helplessly as the soldier took the animal. Confederate soldiers camped at the 
farm of Christian Landis, a Dunker in Augusta County, for four days in the 
fall of 1864. Landis's son had been conscripted into the Confederate army in 
1862, as Landis put it matter-of-factly, "against my will" and "by armed men 
from my house and was killed in the Wilderness." When Federal troops came 
into Augusta at "the time of the burning," they took his corn, and when Lan- 
dis objected "threatened to burn my barn down." The beleaguered Dunker 
gave them "hay, oats, bacon, and provisions," and his wife "cooked for them all 
day." Although the Federal troops spared Landis's barn, they took his horses. 
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Unionists who objected to such seizures were told, according to one postwar 
claimant, "the less I said, the better for me."50 
Like many Unionists, Landis shepherded his sons and daughters north or 
west out of the reach of Confederate conscription agents. Confederates impris- 
oned these resisters when possible and enforced conscription, even shooting at 
Unionists who ran from them. Confederate civilians viewed these resisters as 
potential enemies, and indeed some of them were. When Unionists fled north 
or west to reach Federal lines, some of them joined the U. S. Army. John D. 
Stover, a farmer in New Hope near Staunton, received aid from Unionist David 
Myers, who "advised and encouraged me to go" through the lines to the Fed- 
eral army. Stover left the Valley in 1864, joined the 6th Ohio, and returned 
to the Shenandoah in Sheridan's command. John Yates, another Unionist in 
Augusta, was imprisoned in Castle Thunder for "aiding refugees across the 
lines." Moved to Staunton in September 1864 to stand trial for treason, he was 
liberated by Sheridan's army.51 
When Federal troops moved through Rockingham and Augusta Counties, 
they did not just burn Confederate barns and liberate Unionists from prisons 
-they also freed many slaves. Although slaves had run away throughout the 
war, the pace picked up in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864. Civilians took no- 
tice, but newspapers only reluctantly admitted the hemorrhaging loss of black 
labor. The Staunton Vindicator offered no more than a veiled comment that 
"only white labor is available locally." Confederate civilians also took notice 
when the Union army began to use black troops in Virginia. Amanda Edmonds 
chastised Grant in June for bringing "the abominable wretches and negroes to 
the field." When black soldiers in the Ninth Corps suffered heavy casualties 
in late July during the battle of the Crater at Petersburg, some civilians in the 
Valley expressed paternalist pity. Mary Cochran described the black troops 
as "poor wretches stimulated with whisky and induced to think they would 
meet with no resistance."She considered the grisly result at Petersburg, which 
she attributed to poor conduct by the Federal officers, a sad betrayal of simple 
black men.52 
Many African Americans took the opportunity to join the Federal army 
when it appeared in the Valley. In late September, Sheridan's force impressed 
both free and enslaved African Americans in Staunton to tear up the railroad. 
According to Waddell, the impressed crew were "very indignant and did much 
less damage . . . than they could have done." In the next sentence, however, 
Waddell conceded that "a considerable number of Negroes" went off with the 
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Union army. Federal officers apparently promised to take any willing African 
Americans to Washington, where "they could work for a living." Waddell, like 
Cochran, sneered at such a possibility and considered black men too deluded 
or infantile to know what was good for them. Confederate civilians simply 
could not admit to themselves that slaves felt no loyalty to either the southern 
cause or their masters.53 
Although they typically failed to come to terms with black disloyalty, Con- 
federate civilians turned a more realistic eye toward their soldiers. Civilians felt 
connected to the army and watched its every move. Earlier in the war, they had 
taken pride in the fortitude and resilience demonstrated by Confederate troops 
at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg and in the boldness and power of southern 
soldiers who fought at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville. In 1864 as ear- 
lier, they expected their soldiers to punish the Federal transgressors and to 
sting the northern 
Confederates in uniform were similarly connected to the home front, assess- 
ing reactions behind the lines in light of their own conduct. A soldier named 
John T. Cooley considered the South to be "in a war which we must fight out."' 
In September 1864, he cited the old maxim, "The harder the storm the sooner 
it will be over," to give himself and his civilian relatives some comfort. In a 
letter to his cousin, Cooley listed three things he needed to stay in the field 
and keep up morale: "I can stand the storm very well if I get plenty to eat, and 
can enjoy good health, and be permitted to peruse the thoughts of my highly 
esteemed and affected cousin Julia!" In fact, this was not all Cooley needed. He 
went to prayer meetings, daydreamed about the "blue mountains" of southwest 
Virginia, and confessed to dreading another winter in the field. He feared "that 
we will suffer worse than we ever have." "War is all that can be heard," he ad- 
mitted, "and everybody is tired of that."55 
The battle of Fisher's Hill caused Confederate civilians in the Valley to ex- 
amine closely themselves and their army. On September 22, Early's army fled 
the field at Fisher's Hill in disastrous order. Soldiers referred to it as a "stam- 
pede," "a panic" carried out "at breakneck speed" and in "the greatest confu- 
sion." Elements ofthe army scattered over Massanutten Mountain into the Page 
Valley, not to return to the main body for weeks. Officers and soldiers alike 
understood how embarrassing the loss at Fisher's Hill was for the Confederacy. 
They wrote home to offer explanations full of determination. One soldier, who 
shared his "darkest forebodings," considered the rout "woeful to our young 
country and its cause." Another blamed the "management of the command" 
and considered the army's future in the Valley over. A third called the battle a 
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disgraceful stampede and pronounced the "cavalry so utterly worthless" that it 
could not stop a flank attack on the infantry under any circumstances. Yet this 
last witness sought to assure his mother that the soldiers had "quite recovered 
their morale."56 
Civilians had their doubts. "To all appearance there is no help for us but in 
God," Joseph Waddell lamented. Fisher's Hill sent him into a spiral of depres- 
sion. "A dull feeling of gloom seems to pervade the community," he recorded; 
". . . there is little to hope for in the future. It is like walking through the Valley 
of the Shadow of Death." Incredulous at the depth of depression he witnessed, 
Waddell wondered whether any of his neighbors had not grown tired of the 
war. He claimed that "[alnxiety and gloom were depicted on every counte- 
nance." "For myself," he confessed, "I feel staggered and overcome. Our cause 
seems to be desperate." When Waddell's sister heard that Sheridan's forces had 
crushed the Confederates at Fisher's Hill, she suffered "intensely from nervous 
apprehensions" and dreaded that "she and her children, would be slaughtered, 
or at least starved to death." Waddell regarded the Christianity of the northern 
people as hypocritical because they seemed to take pleasure in the "alarm and 
suffering" of Confederate women and children. Evidence of that suffering lay 
all too readily at hand, whether in Staunton, where Federal troops "destroyed 
publick property," or in the thirteen-mile stretch between Waynesboro and 
Staunton, along which one trooper in the 20th U.S. Cavalry traveled one night 
"guided along the way by blazing haystacks and large granneriesT5' 
When Sheridan's army seemed poised to move out of the Valley in mid- 
October, Confederate civilians and soldiers could hardly believe what had 
happened to them. "I dislike very much to hear of our arms meeting so many 
reverses," one young man wrote his brother, a cavalryman in McCausland's 
brigade. The army previously had always won "victories." Also incensed at the 
conduct of Federal troops in the Valley, the man remarked, "It is almost enough 
to make the blood boil in one's veins to hear of the atrocities and vandalism 
Sheridan has committed." He admitted that the "country" was in a "terrible 
crisis" but tried not to believe that the northern army's cause would prevail. 
"Surely," he thought, "the South can never be subdued by men who commit 
such outrages! The vengeance of a just God will most certainly overtake them 
sooner or later." Joseph Waddell, an admitted pessimist, worried that "officials 
in Richmond" were in a "state ofpanic, . . . making no provision for the future." 
Apparently, he had heard the government was "staking everything on a single 
throw [ofthe dice] ." That strategy seemed desperate to Waddell, who prayed to 
God that the Confederates "may be humble, submissive, and trustful" even in 
Federal soldiers cheer Sheridan as he rides past, with plumes of smoke from burning 
crops and buildings rising in the background. James E. Taylor's sketch conveys strong 
images of Union triumph and destruction that would linger for years among the Valley's 
residents. Courtesy of the Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio. 
the face of slaughter and loss. Waddell, though, came around to seeing cheerful 
news on the horizon. He took comfort in reports of successes west of the Mis- 
sissippi, where he thought "the Confederates appear to have things their own 
way." He thought things looked "a little brighter" on October 1 9 . ~ ~  
The battle of Cedar Creek, fought that October 19 near Middletown, proved 
Waddell wrong and shocked the Valley's civilians. The Confederate army 
plundered the enemy's camps after initial success and then ran pell-mell in the 
face of a counterattack. General Early criticized his men openly in the news- 
papers for their "misconduct" and "disgraceful propensity for plunder." He 
released his postbattle address for publication in the press at the same time 
it was read to his soldiers, an example of how closely Early linked the home 
front and battlefield. His address sought to shame the men, daring those who 
plundered to show their spoils. For each man who dropped out of the ranks at 
Cedar Creek to ransack Federals camps, insisted Early, the plunder would rep- 
resent "badges of his dishonor, the insignia of his disgrace." Old Jube blamed 
officers as well as enlisted men for the turnaround loss. Success, he cautioned, 
came from discipline and from fighting with honor. In his last paragraph, Early 
appealed to the cause and to patriotism, calling on soldiers in the Army of the 
Valley "to do battle like men."59 
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With Early's public pronouncement circulating through newspapers in the 
state, his soldiers wrote home to describe the battle and their role in it. Most 
characterized Cedar Creek as a "painful" and "disgraceful affiir." One young 
Virginia cavalryman admitted that "disaster after disaster attends this army." 
He considered it "very galling" to have to "acknowledge all this" but thought it 
"folly to attempt to smooth things over." After Cedar Creek, the trooper marched 
without a horse and tried to keep up with his unit on foot. He thought the army 
"demoralized" and suggested that Early should "sell out to another firm." Some 
soldiers tried to play down the loss at Cedar Creek, telling their families that the 
battle should be considered a draw. The quartermaster in Thomas L. Rosser's 
cavalry command mentioned "our Troops stopping to plunder their camps," 
but in his tabulation-which did not square with reality-Early's army came 
away from the field with the advantage in captured pieces and men.60 
Word of Early's losses spread quickly across Virginia and beyond. It reached 
troopers in the 1st Battalion Kentucky Mounted Rifles just days after Cedar 
Creek as they traveled through southwestern Virginia to join Confederate 
forces in the Valley. "Our men generally go on this expedition," remarked Ed- 
ward 0. Guerrant, an officer in the unit, "with a heavy heart." At the same 
time, Guerrant recorded in his diary signs of economic and social collapse dur- 
ing the two-week journey. On one twenty-mile march through several small 
towns and past many farms, he "saw nobody" except "the wondering little ne- 
groes and children and the girls at 'Hollins Institute.'" He considered it "pe- 
culiar" to travel through so much of Virginia and see "not a face hardly."' The 
journey brought unsettling moments, as when the Kentuckians heard that their 
horses "will surely starve, so all say." They marched through Augusta County, 
where Guerrant saw "not one in a dozen barns were left standing." Later, above 
Harrisonburg, he witnessed "utter desolation." "You might travel all day and 
night," Guerrant marveled, "and not see a dozen [people]. They were closed in 
their houses if they had [any] ." When Guerrant and his unit arrived at Early's 
camp, they were directed to the lower Luray Valley to join Maj. Gen. Lunsford 
L. Lomax's cavalry division. En route the Kentuckians encountered part of the 
Laurel Brigade, "most of them drunk." Two days later, Guerrant noted, "Ev- 
erybodyjoined in a Philippic against the war."61 
Civilians also observed the deterioration in Confederate capacity to continue 
the war. Joseph Waddell recorded in October that "a considerable number of 
men from the town and county have run off to avoid military duty." When farm- 
ers were drafted into military service, some filed for a writ of habeas corpus in 
a local court "on the ground that the Government had entered into a contract 
to release them from military service" in return for their selling their produce 
to the government at the approved prices. According to Waddell, many of these 
men were "probably hiding in the  mountain^."^^ 
Soldiers who found the Valley's destruction and the loss at Cedar Creek "hu- 
miliating" understandably feared that civilians would lose faith in the army's 
ability to defend them. One deemed it embarrassing "to come back up the Val- 
ley after another thrashing." As the fall campaign unfolded, Jedediah Hotch- 
kiss urged his wife to spread word at home that the army would continue to 
fight. "Our men in the field have lost none of their accustomed courage," he 
emphasized, "their leaders none of their accustomed skills, but our ranks are 
depleted." He viewed the northern advantage as purely one of "numbers" of 
men, and exhorted those at home to "cheerfully come now, and in two months 
all will be well." Especially before the disaster at Cedar Creek, Hotchkiss in- 
sisted that time might still be on the side of the Confederates. "Ifwe are able to 
keep the enemy at bay," he wrote home, ". . . we shall not be troubled by them 
another year." Hotchkiss heard rumors from the North that public opinion 
would not support another year of war. He was "confident" in "a conclusion of 
hostilities with the ending of'Old Abe's' reign." "Everything indicates a strong 
peace movement in the North," Hotchkiss reported hopefully.63 
Lincoln's reelection led many Valley civilians to question their prospects 
for victory. Most recognized that the Republican triumph meant "at least four 
more years of war." Joseph Waddell thought the election would be "discourag- 
ing" for the Confederate soldiers "after all they have endured." He also saw the 
election as evidence of a more determined foe in the North, where the people 
"have declared in favor ofprosecuting the war, even to our e~termination."~~ 
Lincoln's immediate call for one million men further discouraged Con- 
federate civilians, leading some to consider the cause "hopeless" and others 
to encourage more drastic measures to win the war. "Many of our people are 
ready to give up," Waddell observed, "especially the original secessionists." 
He heard rumors that many secessionists wanted to strike a deal with Lincoln, 
ending the war for southern independence with a bargain that preserved some 
aspects of slavery in the South. Waddell found this sentiment reprehensible. 
"I would rather lose slavery and everything and become a serf to Russia," he 
affirmed, than give up the cause. For Waddell, surrendering to save slavery was 
the ultimate admission of failure because it plainly revealed the emptiness of 
Confederate nationalism. An ambivalent supporter of slavery at best, Wad- 
dell preferred "independence without slavery" to capitulation with it. While 
Waddell considered the prospect of arming slaves to fight for the Confederacy, 
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women from neighboring Rockingham County petitioned the secretary ofwar 
to allow them to raise a regiment of female soldiers "armed and equipped to 
perform regular service." The women affirmed their determination "to leave 
our hearthstones - to endure any sacrifice - any privation for the ultimate suc- 
cess of our Holy Cause."'j5 
The war had yielded reversals of fortune, bitter harvests, and deep anxiet- 
ies for its Confederate participants. Widespread destruction in the Valley and 
defeats on the battlefield left soldiers and civilians bewildered. A cavalry quar- 
termaster named D. C. Snyder appealed to a "just God" and could not believe 
"that He will permit such a race of men to subjugate and destroy a people fight- 
ing for all that is dear to enlightened freemen." He was convinced that "retribu- 
tion will surely overtake" an opponent "so lost to the best feelings of our nature 
and who conduct a warfare in such uncivilized ways." As the army moved to 
put detailed men into the ranks, Snyder voiced mixed emotions about leav- 
ing the security of his job and "fighting a foe that makes such warfare upon 
defenseless women and children." He preferred to defend his family at home 
where it counted the most. Instructing his wife in November to take rations 
from the Federal army rather than become a refugee, he urged her "to provide 
for yourself and [the] children" and to stay at home. Snyder described the re- 
gion around the Valley as a world apart from the year before when supplies 
were plentiful. "You can form no idea of how scarce everything is," he warned, 
"and how much suffering must result the coming winter from the scarcity." 
While stationed in Rockingham County in December, Snyder was "surprised" 
that civilians who had lost so much "got along so well." He was less sure of the 
army. "Qualification for office [in the army] now seems to be that of whiskey 
drinking, swearing, deceitfulness and anything else calculated to deceive and 
take advantage," he lamented. "If this war is to continue until the morals of the 
army improve it will be of long duration."66 
The Valley campaign of 1864 impressed upon Confederate civilians that the 
war and their perceptions of it were subject to constant negotiation. Many plant- 
ers and yeomen saw their farms wrecked, barns burned, cattle driven off, and 
crops seized. The Confederate army conscripted nearly every available man, 
while it lost battles, cohesion, and moral direction. Eva Allen's brother Henry 
wrote home from the trenches at Petersburg to tell of a strange story of a "Negro 
man belonging to old Capt. Breckinridge." The former slave fled the plantation 
and "went offwith Hunter" in June 1864. According to Henry, the man deserted 
from the Federal army and came over to the Confederate lines. He told them "he 
was 'sick of soldiering,' and said there were some other Botetourt Negroes in 
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his Regt. all anxious to get back home." Henry was amazed at the strangeness 
of the report, not because a former slave in the Federal army had deserted to 
the Confederacy, but because slaves were actually fighting in the Federal army. 
"Who would have thought four years ago," he wondered, "that the time would 
come when we would be fighting our neighbor's NegroesPV6' 
Confederate civilians found that they did not quite know themselves, that 
their astonishment knew few boundaries. As noted earlier, Amanda Edmonds 
criticized Grant when black Federal soldiers were first deployed in Virginia. She 
wondered whether the Confederates would "ever blot out such a foe?" Later in 
September her question changed: "Will kind Providence forsake us in this day 
of adversity? Will he permit one of the most beautiful countries in the world 
to become enslaved and subjugated?"" The shift in her emphasis was subtle 
but startling. Confederate civilians, tired of the war but determined to fight it 
out, asked themselves in June 1864 whether they would eventually destroy the 
enemy, but by September they wondered whether they were forsaken. The an- 
swers to these questions eluded them, but the questions themselves hung in the 
autumn air. The  Confederacy's enemy demonstrated such determination and 
capacity for war in the Valley that civilians knew the war had altered course. 
At the same time, the Confederate army showed such failure of command and 
lack of discipline that civilians knew they could not rely on it for protection. 
Despite this reversal and their astonishment at it, Confederate civilians in the 
Shenandoah Valley held fast to their desperate, losing cause, hoping, praying, 
and believing that they would not be forsaken. 
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